Atun-Shei's Idiotic Arguments About Civil War Generals
So, I imagine this particular response to Atun-Shei will be uncharacteristically long for me, but of all of his videos I’d say this one is probably the most flawed and inaccurate, so the length of this response will be in line with that. My friend LittleBootsPro will be doing his own response to this video probably in the coming weeks, but before he did, I wanted to write up my own response to it.
The video I’m referencing here is Did the CONFEDERACY have BETTER GENERALS?!?!?! (caps are his). Just for context as to who I am, I've been studying the military campaigns of the Civil War for the better part of three years now, I know what I am talking about so to speak, not to toot my own horn to much but I feel like this post needs me to give a bit of an introduction. I’ve covered some of Shei’s videos before, but this one has been a thorn in my side for a while. I’ve seen several people use the same arguments made in his video against myself which is why I feel the need to respond to it. Without delaying any further, I want to jump right into this trash heap.
Before I begin tearing apart Shei, I need to talk about the sources he uses first. The most cited person in this video is Edward Bonekemper. I’m quite familiar with Bonekemper’s work, I’ve read through a couple books of his, and needless to say I was not impressed. Bonekemper has a real big thing for U.S. Grant, to quote a friend of mine “Bonekemper has his nose so far up Grant’s butt he can smell the cigar”, I’m not saying that simply to discredit Bonekemper, but also to give context to his biases. Bonekemper seemingly is of the opinion that Lee was a bad generals because he couldn’t predict the future. He says Lee should have surrendered after the end of the Overland Campaign (regardless of the fact doing so would be a direct act of insubordination to Davis). Bonekemper also has a habit of glossing over Grant’s mistakes, for example the failure that was the Battle of Belmont, nearly allowing Pillow to breakthrough at Fort Donelson, and the Overland Campaign. That isn’t to say I think Grant was bad, I’d put him in the top three generals of the Civil War, but ignoring his mistakes is simply dishonest.
I also need to mention Shei’s strawman here. I, nor anyone else I know of is making the argument that the South had “better generals”, I believe there were excellent commanders on both sides, Lee, Jackson, Forrest, Hampton, Beauregard, Cleburne, A.P. Hill, D.H. Hill, Taylor, Stuart, Mahone, and Hoke to name a few Confederates, as for Federal generals Grant, Thomas, Hancock, Reynolds, Sheridan, Custer, Wilson, Sedgwick, Buford, Meade, Samuel Curtis, Phil Kearny, and Charles Griffin stand out. I also do not believe Confederate soldiers were any more or any less brave, heroic, and gallant than Union soldiers.
With all that out of the way, I can actually address the arguments made in the video itself. Shei starts out the video attempting to “debunk” the claim that the Confederates lost due to a lack of manpower and resources. But, if Shei has read Bonekemper he would realize that Bonekemper does attribute a lack of manpower and resources to Confederate defeat, Bonekemper’s argument rests on the idea that Lee was basically too stupid to properly use his resources. So it seems Shei is contradicting Bonekemper’s ridiculous idea. But the fact does remain that the Confederate manpower shortage was one of the biggest reasons that the South lost the war. By the war’s end, the Confederate army was so badly depleted that Grant outnumbered Lee nearly 3-1.
Shei first starts off talking about Lee’s farewell address, which states the following:
“Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia, 10th April 1865.
General Order No. 9
After four years of arduous service marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.
I need not tell the survivors of so many hard fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that I have consented to the result from no distrust of them.
But feeling that valour and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the loss that must have attended the continuance of the contest, I have determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past services have endeared them to their countrymen.
By the terms of the agreement, officers and men can return to their homes and remain until exchanged. You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed, and I earnestly pray that a merciful God will extend to you his blessing and protection.
With an unceasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your Country, and a grateful remembrance of your kind and generous consideration for myself, I bid you an affectionate farewell.
R. E. Lee, General, General Order No. 9”
Shei claims that Lee was simply lifting his own responsibility for the defeat of the ANV off of himself. But I fail to see any falsehoods here. At Appomattox Lee had about 26,000 effectives whereas Grant had 63,000, which wasn’t even the full strength of his army. Lee attempted, of course, to breakthrough the Federal lines, being almost successful, but as Gordon’s men crested the ridge, they saw a huge Federal juggernaut waiting for them below, with that Lee made the final decision to meet with Grant. So in the end, it was overwhelming numbers and resources which compelled the ANV to surrender.
Shei then makes another strawman, and says:
“it was all just overwhelming numbers and resources, no other reason, certainly not Confederate mismanagement or the competency and skill of the United States Army.”
Of course, I am not claiming this. I do not deny that the competency of Grant and the AOP cavalry was a big reason why Lee got boxed in at Appomattox. Both can be true, that Lee lost to a competent general who knew how to properly manage his overwhelming resources.
Shei goes on to say “God isn’t always on the side with the biggest battalions, history is full of wars where the side with the lower population and fewer resources won, the Haitian Revolution, Vietnam War, and the Winter War.”
There is alot to point out with this statement, but lets start with the Haitian Revolution, firstly the Haitians heavily outnumbered the rather small white population, that and the Haitians had foreign support from Britain. Next, the Vietnam War, firstly the Vietnam War is a much different affair to what happened in the American Civil War, the Vietnamese largely fought using unconventional tactics, much of which would have been completely impossible during the American Civil War. Not to mention that, once again, the North Vietnamese had substantial foreign support which the Confederates did not. Finally the Winter War. Shei had to correct this point in the comments, because as many people pointed out, the Finnish lost the Winter War.
Shei then continues to say “I think [the Confederates] had a better chance of winning the Civil War than we did the American Revolution.”
Well that is a really bold statement, especially considering that the French and the Spanish sent troops to America to fight in the war, committed their Navies to fighting off the British Navy, and gave the Patriots substantial amounts of arms and other resources. The Confederates had absolutely none of that.
Shei goes on to say: “History shows that a large industrial capacity does not exactly correlate to a nation’s ability or willingness to make a war.”
No, but large industrial capacity does most certainly help. He goes on to talk about Northern anti-war sentiment, which I’m not exactly going to talk about here because it has close to nothing to do with the topic at hand.
Shei goes on to talk about George McClellan, calling him supposedly “timid.” Any of the criticism of McClellan, particularly that following the Battle of Sharpsburg I’d say is unfair. If Lincoln was unfair to Meade following Gettysburg, then he was most certainly unfair to McClellan after Sharpsburg. McClellan complained that his army was lacking supplies, that in addition to the fact his army had been very badly mauled at Sharpsburg means any pursuit of Lee out of Maryland would be extremely dangerous. Not only that, but McClellan had just been the first general to decisively defeat Lee at the Battle of South Mountain, kicking him out of Maryland.
I’ll skip over his strawman about the Confederacy “dying of States Rights”, and go on to address his question of “What is so great about all these secesh generals?”
Well, I’m going to start with William Mahone, before the war he was a railroad man with no military experience, but Mahone consistently proved himself to be an excellent general, particularly during the Petersburg Campaign during which he launched a surprise attack on Hancock’s Corps during the Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road, ending Grant’s attempt to envelop Petersburg, and his counterattack at the Battle of the Crater saved Petersburg from capture from the Federals.
Another example? John Brown Gordon, a lawyer with no military experience, he rose through the ranks, proving himself a gallant commander at Sharpsburg, being wounded several times during the battle while remaining in command. His attack on Barlow’s knoll on July 1st at Gettysburg broke the XI Corps’ lines, sending them running back to the high ground. He launched a surprise attack during the Battle of the Wilderness which sent fear into Federal high command that he was about to cut off their path of retreat back across the Rapidan. He later took the 2nd Corps command, and going on to prove himself as an excellent Corps commander, even while all seemed lost like at 3rd Petersburg.
How about Patrick Cleburne? Perhaps the best divisional commander of either side of the Civil War. A poor Irish Immigrant who came to America and made a name for himself. The American dream right? His surprise attack at Shiloh broke the Union line, and nearly ended in the death of William T. Sherman. At Missionary Ridge he once again gave Sherman a run for his money, while the rest of the Confederate line broke Cleburne’s Division held against the brunt of Sherman’s attacks. Cleburne’s Division was the only Confederate force to retreat in good order following the battle. Only a couple days later Cleburne stopped Hooker’s attempt to cut the Confederate army off from retreat, very likely saving the AOT.
I could list more, but I’m not going to waste time. Shei now goes on to “Stonewall” Jackson, attempting to denigrate his service. Shei claims that Jackson “froze” during the Seven Days Battles. Is that really the case though? Well no, not really. Jackson and his men had just come from the Valley, they were completely exhausted and worn out as was Jackson himself. Jackson had barely gotten any sleep over the last two months, sleeping only for a couple hours every night while attempting to manage his army. It is a miracle him or his men were in any shape to fight following the Valley Campaign.
Shei says that Jackson’s death was “the best thing that could have happened for his reputation…could you imagine him fighting in the defensive grind of the Overland or the grueling trench warfare of the Petersburg Campaign.”
I actually could imagine that, Jackson was a decent defensive general in addition to his skills as a offensive commander as he had shown at 2nd Manassas, Sharpsburg, and Fredericksburg. It also poses the question, if we are going to go along with counterfactuals, would there have even been an Overland or Petersburg Campaign if Jackson had survived?
Shei then says “I think a compelling argument could be made that Jackson’s offensive tactics did more harm than good, take Chancellorsville for example, sure he won a flashy tactical victory…but what did he actually accomplish?”
Well, he completely routed the Xl Corps opening Lee’s path for victory the next day. The Xl Corps would be completely ineffective at Gettysburg because of the losses they had sustained at Chancellorsville, and would eventually be forced to disband. The victory at Chancellorsville itself put Lee back on the offensive, opening his path into Pennsylvania, and in addition to the victory gained at Chancellorsville, the losses the Union Army sustained at Gettysburg would make it incapable of launching any more major offensives into Virginia for another full year.
Shei attempts to underplay this, but it really is no small feat. He continues and goes on to say “time and again, rebel generals tried to one shot Union armies with flashy tactical victories…sure they may maul a corps and gain a victory, but the Yankees always came back.”
This is a completely dishonest characterization of Confederate strategy. Lee’s strategy was to wage an aggressive war, yes. Why though? Because Lee knew a long, drawn out defensive war (like what Longstreet and Johnston wanted) would never work, especially with the blockade. Lee was running out of time, and he needed to win the war quickly. This was the best strategy the Confederates could have adopted.
Also note the use of the term “flashy tactical victories”, that term can be seen alot and I believe Atun-Shei really has given rise to it’s usage. Lee’s victories were not only tactical, but strategic victories. They always gave him a strategic advantage, the Seven Days Battles gave Lee the opportunity to strike back into Northern Virginia, sending Pope’s army fleeing for example.
Shei’s strawman then goes on to say “The Union high command was a veritable menagerie of nincompoops, Burnside, Pope, Butler, Banks, Meade.”
Ok, so while I 100% agree with calling Pope, Banks, and Butler horrible commanders, I take some objection with the others. Burnside is most famous for his disastrous Fredericksburg Campaign, aswell as the Battle of the Crater. First thing to note with the Fredericksburg Campaign is that Burnside never wanted the AOP command in the first place, he took it simply to stop Hooker from having it. Burnside knew that Hooker was an opportunist and a snake, which is why he took the command. What happened at Fredericksburg itself can be largely blamed on Burnside’s Grand Division commanders, not Burnside himself. As for what happened at the Crater, we can largely blame Grant and Meade for that. Burnside originally planned to use Ferrero’s black division to lead the attack following the detonation of the mine, but Grant, for political reasons refused to allow Burnside to use them, regardless of the fact they had undergone extra drilling, and were fresh.
Shei goes on to say to the strawman “don’t you dare talk about Meade”, but I think there are some valid criticisms of Meade to be made, though I don’t think he was bad by any means. Meade often butted heads with Grant, which is probably a huge contributing factor behind the disasters throughout the Overland and Petersburg Campaigns. His performance in the early war was excellent, however. I do agree with Shei’s other points about Meade, however. But I’m not sure how many people are really calling Meade incompetent.
Following his arguments about Meade, Shei decides to talk about the Western Theater, but the funny thing is that he will only talk about one Confederate general from the Western Theater, that being Forrest. He neglects to talk about Cleburne, Wheeler, Morgan, Hampton, Breckinridge, or Cheatham, which I think is a disservice.
Shei doesn’t spend much time on Forrest’s actual military career, rather he decides to talk about his alleged membership in the KKK. The source he uses for that subject is Andy Hall’s blog. If you have followed me for a while you should well know my distain for Hall. Hall's blog post basically argues that Forrest lied in front of Congress, to which their is no evidence of, and he also argues without evidence that Forrest also lied during the famous Pollbearer’s Speech, Shei also makes this claim (regardless of the fact he would have no reason to have lied, and it damaged his reputation amongst some other Southerners). But more egregious is his supposed evidence of Forrest’s Klan involvement. His first piece of evidence is the book The Invisible Empire by Laura Rose published in 1914. Her evidence of Forrest’s involvement is a letter she was sent supposedly by James R. Crowe who died in 1911. What is important to note is that the original copy of the letter does not exist and this book was published three years after Crowe’s death. It is very reminiscent of a “I knew a guy who knew a guy” situation.
So the first account of Forrest’s involvement is unreliable. The second account is very similar in character. It comes from Thomas Dixon Jr., who wrote a piece in the The Metropolitan Magazine which was later used in John Morton’s autobiography. Morton himself was a Klan member, aswell as a close friend of Forrest. But, similarly to the other account this comes over 40 years after the war, and it wasn’t even written by Morton himself. So both of Andy Hall’s accounts are second hand. Hall argues that because Morton endorsed it, that means Dixon’s account must be true. It may also be possible that Dixon was simply lying and Morton went along with it? Why might he do that? Because Forrest was a very popular and well known general during and following the war. Morton was a very high ranking Klan member. It was long speculated that Forrest was a leading member of the Klan, perhaps he did it simply to bolster the reputation of the old Klan? It is hard to say, but I certainly do remain unconvinced by second hand accounts from decades after the fact.
To be clear, I’m not arguing that Forrest was or wasn’t in the Klan. We simply don’t know if he was or if he wasn’t. It is impossible to know. It may very well be possible he was in the Klan, and lets say he was, what was the nature of the Reconstruction era Klan? It was mostly a response to radical reconstruction, and regardless of the single account of violence provided in Shei’s video, it seems most of the Klan was mostly nonviolent. It was very loosely organized, and there were most certainly parts of it that were violent, while other parts of the Klan were not. I’m personally of the opinion that Forrest was in the Klan for a time. How long, and what was the nature of his involvement? We may never know. None of this has anything to with the topic of the video though. Shei also briefly mentions Fort Pillow, of which there is no evidence Forrest ordered the massacre, though there is ample evidence Forrest stopped it:
“They refused to surrender–which incensed our men & if General Forrest had not run between our men & the Yanks with his pistol and sabre drawn not a man would have been spared.”
-Samuel H. Caldwell, a Confederate surgeon
“If it had not been for General Forrest coming up and ordering the Confederates to stop killing the prisoners, there would not one of us been alive today.”
-Samuel Green, 6th U.S. Colored Artillery
Both Union and Confederate accounts show Forrest attempting to stop the massacre. Finally, Shei does address Forrest’s military actions by talking about Benjamin Grierson, who he basically claims is one of the best cavalry commanders of the war, which I’m not at all sure how he could come to that conclusion. The example he uses of Grierson’s brilliance is his raid during the Vicksburg Campaign. What Shei neglects to mention is that Johnston took away all of Pemberton’s cavalry, and Grierson went completely unopposed. Grierson would end up facing Forrest at Brice’s Crossroads, during which Grierson performed horribly.
Shei then says “sure Forrest’s raids were flashy and daring, but did they really make a huge difference to the outcome of those campaigns.”
The answer is yes, they sure did. Forrest’s rearguard actions at Shiloh saved the retreating Army of Mississippi from Sherman’s attempted interception. Forrest’s West Tennessee Raid, in combination with Van Dorn’s Holly Spring Raid, and Sherman’s failure at Chickasaw Bayou forced Grant to abandon his planned attempt at an overland march to Vicksburg, and Forrest’s rearguard actions once again saved the Army of Tennessee from absolute destruction following the Battle of Nashville. There are many other things I could point to, but to attempt to undersell Forrest’s campaigns and raids is simply dishonest.
Shei decides to shift off from Forrest, and says “In my mind [the Confederates] only had one good strategic minded general, who really saw the big picture rather than individual maneuvers and battles, and he was Joseph E. Johnston.”
I have to ask, is Shei joking? Because I’m not at all sure how you can rationalize this. Johnston performed horribly throughout the war. The Battle of Seven Pines should have been a sweeping Confederate victory, except for Johnston’s tendency for overplanning and micromanaging. He very well may have given up Richmond if he wasn’t wounded. Johnston’s habit of retreating basically led Sherman right to the gates of Atlanta, which is why he was relieved and replaced by Hood. Johnston took away Pemberton’s Cavalry during the Vicksburg Campaign which led to the eventual capture of Vicksburg.
Shei says this “most other rebel generals thought of attacking or defending dots on a map…but Johnston understood that when your outnumbered and outgunned stubbornly holding on to bits of dirt can be counter productive.”
Uh, what? Richmond? Atlanta? Vicksburg? Those are not just “bits of dirt”, but Johnston had no issue in giving all three of them up if he could have. These are the most important cities the south had and they needed to be defended at all costs.
Shei then goes on to talk about George Henry Thomas, he claims Thomas is basically unknown, which I’d say is hardly true, considering how many memes I see spread about him on twitter. Thomas was widely celebrated by those who served under his command following the war, and several GAR camps were named in his honor.
Shei then starts talking about Thomas’ wartime exploits, his first comment is a little baffling, he says “in a skirmish before the 1st Battle of Bull Run he actually went toe to toe with Stonewall Jackson and kicked his…ass.”
I believe he is referring to the Battle of Hoke’s Run, during which Jackson was tasked with delaying forces under Robert Patterson consisting of Thomas’ Brigade, which Jackson did, slowly falling back but successfully delaying the Federals, and according to the NPS, he fell back in good order once the rest of Patterson’s force arrived. I’m not sure how far that goes in terms of ass kicking, especially considering it is an engagement I’ve never even heard of before, and had to do a bit of searching to even find what he was referencing, but that is Atun-Shei for you.
Shei then talks a bit about Thomas’ holding actions at Chickamauga, but fails to mention the assistance given to Thomas’ by Granger’s Corps. He makes it sound as though Thomas was completely alone, which he wasn’t.
Shei goes on to talk about the Battle of Missionary Ridge, he overplays Sherman’s role in the battle, neglecting to mention that Sherman’s attacks on the ridge were stalled by Patrick Cleburne. Shei also fails to mention that Thomas was very hesitant about attacking Missionary Ridge, delaying for a large period of time before actually sending in his divisions.
Shei then says “Then in December 1864 Thomas faced off against John Bell Hood, who sucks by the way…”
Really? Hood sucks? Hood performed excellently during the Seven Days Battles, aswell as at Second Manassas and Antietam as a brigade and divisional commander. His idea of flanking the Federal line on July 2nd at Gettysburg also would have probably worked if it weren’t for Longstreet’s refusals, his attack at Chickamauga broke the Federal line and sent Rosecrans flying, when he took command of the AOT he was placed in a horrible position which Johnston had left him in, and did what he could to try and get out of it, and the Battles of Franklin and Nashville can largely be blamed on his subordinates, not himself.
Shei then claims the AOT was destroyed following Franklin and Nashville, but that is hardly true. Sure, the AOT was badly mauled but it was able to reform later as the Army of the South. He claims George Thomas never lost a movement or a battle, which I find weird considering he did have to retreat from Chickamauga. He also claims Thomas may have been the greatest general of either side of the war, which I couldn’t disagree with more, especially considering his slowness during the Battles of Missionary Ridge and Nashville.
Shei moves on to talk about Grant, his strawman makes the argument that Grant was a drunk, which is something I disagree with. I like Grant, I just don’t like Shei lying to make Grant seem better than he actually was. I also don’t agree with the idea that Grant was a butcher. Both of these things are strawman arguments.
Shei does attempt to justify the casualties of the Overland Campaign by saying “Well [the Union] was on the offensive in that campaign, and the attackers do tend to take more casualties than the defenders.” He neglects to mention that Lee was actually on the attack at the Battle of the Wilderness, he also neglects to mention that Grant was on the defensive at Shiloh and took higher casualties there than did Beauregard and Johnston.
He seemingly has a hard time believing that Grant perhaps just underestimated Lee during the Overland Campaign. I don’t believe that the higher losses the Union sustained during the campaign were a result of Grant being reckless, but rather him misjudging Lee, especially so after the Battle of the Wilderness. Following the Battle of the Wilderness, Grant basically believed Lee’s army was on the brink of collapse, he believed a final army wide assault on Lee would break the ANV, which is what he attempted at Spotsylvania and that failed horrifically, though he did get a foothold at the Mule Shoe. Following Spotsylvania Grant thought for sure Lee was done for, not realizing that Lee was receiving reinforcements from the Valley, it was Grant’s misjudging that resulted in his decision to attack at Cold Harbor, which too failed horrifically. Grant wasn’t reckless, he simply underestimated Lee.
Grant did have a tendency to launch very risky frontal assaults, as he did at Vicksburg only a year prior. Was it out of malice? No, but it came from Grant simply underestimating the Confederates.
Shei says “the carnage of the Overland Campaign was necessary to bring the war to a timely conclusion.” Perhaps if Shei was referring to the Petersburg or Appomattox Campaign I would agree. But Grant’s Overland Campaign was a resounding failure, Grant failed in all of his goals and was forced into fighting a siege campaign at Petersburg which he never wanted to do.
Shei says that Lee froze during the Petersburg Campaign, which I’m not sure how? Lee couldn’t send any troops away, Early’s force being sent into the Valley was all he could spare, and the defense of the Shenandoah was completely necessary as it was the breadbasket of the Confederacy. Shei attempts to underplay the importance of Richmond. Regardless of his claims, indeed the defense of Richmond was essential, it housed the only iron works in the entirety of the Confederacy, was a major supply hub, and simply could not be given up.
Shei claims “while Lee was defending Virginia to the last Sherman snuck up behind him…” Really? He did? Sherman famously failed to reach Petersburg before the Appomattox surrender.
Shei claims that Lee didn’t care about the other theaters of the war, and that he neglected the other theaters. As Shei’s strawman says, Lee wasn’t promoted to General-in-Chief until 1865, until then he was the commander of the ANV alone. It wasn’t his responsibility to manage what was going on out west. Shei goes on to talk about Lee’s refusal to send troops West to aid in the Defense of Vicksburg, Lee’s refusal to do so I believe was well founded. Hooker’s Army was still menacing in Virginia, sending any troops away could permit Hooker to launch another offensive, and it is doubtful any of Lee’s men would even reach Vicksburg in time. Later the same year, 1863 Lee would send Longstreet’s whole Corps to the west for the Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns, so the claim that Lee didn’t care about the Western Theater simply doesn’t make sense.
Shei now goes on to claim that Lee was a butcher, he brings up Chancellorsville as an example while using the percentages of men lost rather than the actual numbers themselves. This I think only goes to reenforce the point of the Union’s manpower advantage.
He then makes this claim straight from Bonekemper’s book: “Lee took an average killed or wounded casualty rate of 20.2 percent while inflicting a killed or wounded casualty rate of 15.4 percent, in total he lost 121,000 men. Grant on the other hand suffered an average killed or wounded casualty rate of 18.1 percent and inflicted an average killed or wounded casualty rate of 20.7 percent, in total he took 94,000 casualties.”
Bonekemper’s numbers here seem skewed, considering Grant took nearly 100,000 casualties against Lee in 1864 and 1865 alone, I’m really curious as to how he came to the numbers he did.
Shei now gets into Lee’s personality. I’m not going to bother with this, perhaps I will cover that in a separate blog post by itself, but just to give my final thoughts on this video, it was one of the worst videos on Civil War military history which I have even watched. Shei should feel ashamed of himself for it.
Videos, books, and articles in question:
https://www.youtube.come/watch?v=O1MQflqi2VM&t
https://deadconfederates.com/2011/12/11/nathan-bedford-forrest-joins-the-klan/
https://www.amazon.com/Grant-Lee-Victorious-Vanquished-Virginian/dp/162157010X
https://www.amazon.com/Ulysses-S-Grant-Butcher-Military/dp/1596986417
Sources:
https://www.battlefields.org/learn/primary-sources/gen-robert-e-lee-farewell-address
https://www.battlefields.org/learn/civil-war/battles/appomattox-court-house
https://www.amazon.com/Appomattox-Campaign-Chris-Calkins/dp/1889246557
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7HHPFk1KIc
https://uncpress.org/book/9781469638577/a-campaign-of-giants-the-battle-for-petersburg/
https://www.amazon.com/Petersburg-Campaign-Eastern-Battles-August/dp/1611210909
https://www.amazon.com/Last-Citadel-Petersburg-Virginia-1864-April/dp/0807118613
https://www.amazon.com/Gettysburg-Stephen-W-Sears/dp/0618485384
https://www.amazon.com/Bloody-Spring-Forty-Sealed-Confederacys/dp/0306822067
https://www.amazon.com/Bloody-Roads-South-Wilderness-May-June/dp/0807126446
https://www.amazon.com/Rebel-Yell-Violence-Redemption-Stonewall/dp/1451673299
https://www.amazon.com/Bust-Hell-Wide-Open-Bedford/dp/1621575934
https://danvillevthistorical.org/april-1864-sticks-and-stones-may-break-my-bones-but-words-can-never-hurt-me/
https://www.essentialcivilwarcurriculum.com/fort-pillow.html#:~:text=Several%20black%20artillerymen%2C%20like%20Samuel,then%2C%20although%20most%20current%20historians
https://www.amazon.com/Chancellorsville-Stephen-W-Sears/dp/039587744X
https://www.nps.gov/civilwar/search-battles-detail.htm?battleCode=WV002